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We develop a new method to quantify the secret key rate for permutation-invariant protocols for
coherent attacks and finite resources. The method reduces the calculation of secret key rates for
coherent attacks to the calculation for collective attacks by bounding the smooth min-entropy of
permutation-invariant states via the smooth min-entropy of corresponding tensor-product states.
The comparison of the results to the well-known post-selection technique for the BB84 and six-state
protocol shows the high relevance of this method. Since our calculation of secret key rates for
coherent attacks strongly depends on the way of treating collective attacks, a prospective progress
in the analysis of collective attacks will immediately cause progress in our strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
The aim of quantum key distribution (QKD) is the
generation of a secret key between two authorized par-
ties Alice and Bob in the presence of an eavesdropper
Eve. In practical implementations the number of signals
used to establish a secure key is finite. An essential ele-
ment of the calculation of key rates for a finite number
of signals is the evaluation of the smooth min-entropy
[1] for high-dimensional states, which is in general hard
or even impossible to compute. In the last years many
results have appeared [1–11] considering the calculation
of secret key rates for finite resources under the restric-
tion of the eavesdropper’s attack to a collective attack
[12, 13], where Eve interacts with each signal indepen-
dently and identically. This restriction leads to a state,
which has tensor-product form and allows to bound the
smooth min-entropy by the conditional von Neumann
entropy of a single-signal state by using the asymptotic
equipartition property (AEP) [1, 14].
In studies of coherent attacks [15, 16] the eavesdropper
is not restricted at all, i.e. she may interact with all
signals simultaneously. Already in the year 2005 it was
shown in [17, 18] that for protocols, which are invariant
under permutations of single-signal states, collective and
coherent attacks are equivalent in the case of infinitely
many signals. But for a finite number of signals this
equivalence has not been proven yet. As a consequence
the development of tools to compute a secret key for finite
resources in the presence of coherent attacks is necessary.
Up to now direct strategies that treat coherent attacks
only exist for the BB84 [19] protocol (see [10],[11]). In
[10] Tomamichel et al used an uncertainty relation for
smooth entropies [20] to circumvent the evaluation of the
smooth min-entropy by the computation of the smooth
max-entropy [1]. Since the resulting max-entropy has to
be evaluated for a classical state, the calculation becomes
analytically solvable.
In comparison to these direct strategies, many studies
have focused on indirect approaches like post-selection
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[21] or the de Finetti approach [1, 22] to quantify se-
cret key rates, where the analysis for coherent attacks
is traced back to the investigation of collective attacks.
In [7], these indirect approaches have been compared to
each other for the BB84 protocol with the result, that the
post-selection technique exceeds the de Finetti approach
in terms of secure key rates.
In this paper we present a new strategy to calculate
secret key rates for general permutation-invariant (i.e.
the output of the protocol remains the same under per-
mutations of the input pairs) protocols for coherent at-
tacks. In particular, we relate the secret key rate for
coherent attacks to the calculation of secret key rates for
collective attacks by bounding the smooth min-entropy
of a permutation-invariant state via the min-entropy of
a corresponding tensor-product state “smoothed” over
a reduced environment. We compare the results to the
post-selection technique by applying the AEP-bound for
the treatment of collective attacks. Note that most of
the protocols studied in the literature already fulfill the
condition of permutation-invariance or can made to be
permutation-invariant, like e.g the BB84 and six-state
[23, 24] protocol.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we
explain the protocol and fix the notation. We clarify the
formalism used to calculate secret key rates under the
assumption of collective attacks in Section III. The for-
malism to analyze coherent attacks, the main result of
this paper, is presented in Section IV. Section V shortly
reviews the post-selection technique, which is then com-
pared to the new strategy with respect to secret key rates
for the BB84 and six-state protocol in Section VI. Finally,
Section VII concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this paper we consider permutation-invariant
entanglement-based QKD protocols, which consist of the
steps: state distribution, sifting, parameter estimation
(PE), error correction (EC), error verification and pri-
vacy amplification (PA) (for a detailed description see
[17, 18]). Here, permutational invariance means that for
any permutation of the input pairs the output of the pro-
2tocol remains unchanged. In the following we denote by
ρNAB the initial state of N signals shared by Alice and
Bob, and by ρNABE a purification of ρ
N
AB, which describes
the state shared by Alice, Bob and Eve after the state
distribution. Now, let NAB be the operation, that rep-
resents the procedures, which Alice and Bob perform on
their states, i.e. measurement, sifting, parameter estima-
tion, error correction and error verification. (Note that
privacy amplification is not included here, since the out-
put of this procedure is the final bit-string used as key.)
Then we define the resulting classical-quantum state con-
taining Alice’s bit string and Eve’s quantum state as
ρnXE := (NAB ⊗ 11E) ρNABE . As the main quantity for
the calculation of secret key rates we use the smooth
min-entropy [1]
Hεmin (ρAE |E) := sup
σAE∈B
ε
2 (ρAE)
sup
ρE∈S(HE)
Hmin (σAE |ρE) ,
(1)
defined as an optimization of the min-entropy
Hmin (σAE |ρE) := sup
{
λ ∈ R : 2−λ11A ⊗ ρE − σAE ≥ 0
}
(2)
over an ε2 -environment given by
B ε2 (ρ) :=
{
σ :
1
2
||σ − ρ||1 ≤
ε
2
}
, (3)
with the 1-norm ||A||1 = tr
(√
AA†
)
. S(HE) denotes the
set of density operators on the Hilbert space HE .
III. COLLECTIVE ATTACK
In contrast to coherent attacks, the assumption of col-
lective attacks forces the eavesdropper Eve to interact
with each of the signals separately. Under this restric-
tion the distributed state can for permutation-invariant
protocols be regarded as a product state ρ⊗NAB , which is
diagonal in the Bell-basis [17, 18]. We denote by m the
number of randomly chosen signals used for parameter
estimation and by n the remaining number of signals for
privacy amplification. Then, the rate of an ε-secure key
can be quantified in the following way.
Theorem 1. [3] Let εPE, εEC, εPA, ε¯ > 0 and let ρ
⊗n
XE =
(NAB ⊗ 11E) ρ⊗NABE be a tensor-product state for a purifi-
cation ρABE in HABE of the state ρAB ∈ S(HAB). Then
the rate of an εcoll := (εPE + εEC + εPA + ε¯)-secure key
is given by
r :=
1
N
inf
ρAB∈Γcoll
(
H ε¯min
(
ρ⊗nXE |E
)− leakEC)+ 2
N
log2 (2εPA) .
(4)
The smooth min-entropy of the classical-quantum
state ρ⊗nXE shared by Alice and Eve and the correction
2 log2 (2εPA) arise from the analysis of privacy amplifica-
tion. The entropy quantifies Eve’s uncertainty of Alice’s
bit-string.
The term leakEC stands for the number of bits which
Alice and Bob leak to the eavesdropper due to public
communication during the error correction procedure and
cost for the error verification. In total, the leakage can
be estimated by [3, 10]
leakEC := n1.1H(X |Y ) + log2
(
2
εEC
)
. (5)
Here, the factor 1.1 denotes the efficiency of a specific
error-correction protocol used during the key-generation.
The minimization of the smooth min-entropy is due to
parameter estimation, where we only except qubit-states
ρAB which are contained in the set [10]
Γcoll :=
{
σAB :
1
2
||Pm − Pn||1 ≤ ξ (εPE, n,m)
}
(6)
with
ξ (εPE, n,m) :=
√
(n+m)(m+ 1) ln (1/εPE)
8m2n
. (7)
This means, that the tolerated quantum bit error rate
(QBER) Pm due to anm-fold independent application of
a POVM E on a tensor-product state is ξ-close to the pa-
rameter Pn, which corresponds to a virtual measurement
on the remaining n signals, which are used for the key
generation, except with probability εPE (see Lemma 6 in
the Appendix). Note that this estimate has been devel-
oped in [10] for coherent attacks, i.e. Lemma 6 holds for
permutation-invariant states. As tensor-product states
in collective attacks are permutation-invariant, Lemma 6
can be applied.
For product states ρ⊗nXE we can use the asymptotic
equipartition property (see Eq. (B7)) to bound the
smooth min-entropy by the conditional von Neumann en-
tropy of a single copy ρXE . Finally, we get for the rate
of an εcoll := (εPE + εEC + εPA + ε¯)-secure key:
rcoll :=
n
N
[
inf
ρAB∈Γcoll
(
S(X |E)− leakEC
n
)
− 5
√
log2(2/ε¯)
n
]
+
2
N
log2 (2εPA) (8)
where
S(X |E) = S(ρXE)− S(ρE) (9)
with S(ρ) := − tr (ρ log2 ρ).
In the next section we present a formalism to treat
coherent attacks. We will see that the analysis of secret
key rates for coherent attacks can be traced back to the
calculation of secret key rates under the assumption of
collective attacks (see Eq. (8)).
IV. COHERENT ATTACK
A coherent attack is the most general attack an eaves-
dropper can perform, i.e. Eve is not restricted at all. For
3the investigation of secret key rates for coherent attacks,
we have to consider non-product states for the evalua-
tion of the smooth-min entropy. No changes are needed
in the analysis of parameter estimation for collective at-
tacks (see Eq. (6)), because it also holds for coherent
attacks (i.e. non-product states (see Lemma 6 in the
Appendix)). Since error correction and error verifica-
tion are also independent of the underlying attack of the
eavesdropper (they are purely classical procedures), the
protocol analysis for these steps can be adopted from the
one for collective attacks.
For permutation-invariant protocols it has been shown
in [17] and [18] that we can assume w.l.o.g. that, after
the distribution of N qubit pairs, Alice and Bob share a
permutation-invariant quantum state, which is a convex
combination of tensor-products of Bell-states:
ρNAB = PN
( ∑
n∈ΛN
µnσ
⊗n1
1 ⊗ σ⊗n22 ⊗ σ⊗n33 ⊗ σ⊗n44
)
(10)
with probabilities µn for the “realization” n and the set
of realizations
ΛN :=
{
n = (n1, n2, n3, n4) :
4∑
i=1
ni = N
}
. (11)
The σi for i = 1, .., 4 correspond to the projector onto
the 4 Bell-states in HA ⊗HB , i.e.
σ1 =
∣∣φ+〉 〈φ+∣∣ ,
σ2 =
∣∣φ−〉 〈φ−∣∣ ,
σ3 =
∣∣ψ+〉 〈ψ+∣∣ ,
σ4 =
∣∣ψ−〉 〈ψ−∣∣ , (12)
with ∣∣φ±〉 := 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) and (13)
∣∣ψ±〉 := 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉) . (14)
PN denotes the completely positive map (CPM) which
symmetrizes the state with respect to all possible distin-
guishable permutations of the N qubit pairs.
The following section explains the analysis of pa-
rameter estimation for permutation-invariant states (see
Eq. (10)).
A. Parameter estimation
Let the sifting procedure now be such that Ns = n+m
signals remain, wherem denotes the number of randomly
chosen signals used for parameter estimation and n de-
notes the remaining number of signals for privacy am-
plification. Then we can adopt Lemma 6 to estimate
the QBER Qn by the tolerated QBER Qm coming from
a measurement on general permutation-invariant states
(see also the arguments below Eq. (7)).
Theorem 2. Let εPE > 0 and m + n = Ns. Let
ρNsAB ∈ S
(
H⊗NsAB
)
be a permutation-invariant quantum
state, and let E be a POVM on HAB which measures
the QBER. Let Qm and Qn be the frequency distri-
butions when applying the measurement E⊗m and E⊗n,
respectively, to different subsystems of ρNsAB. Then for
any element Qm and Qn from Qm and Qn except with
probability εPE
1
2
||Qm −Qn||1 ≤ ξ (εPE, n,m) (15)
with ξ(εPE, n,m) :=
√
(m+n)(m+1) ln (1/εPE)
8m2n .
Proof: This follows directly from Lemma 6 in the Ap-
pendix, which is a consequence of [10].
Now with the definition of the set of states, which pass
the parameter estimation procedure
ΓnεPE :=
{
σnAB :
1
2
||Qm −Qn||1 ≤ ξ (εPE, n,m)
}
, (16)
we are able to give an analytic expression for the rate of
an ε-secure key for coherent attacks.
Corollary 1. Let εPE, εEC, εPA, ε¯ > 0 and let ρ
n
XE =
(NAB ⊗ 11E) ρNABE be a permutation-invariant state for
a purification ρNABE in H⊗NABE of ρNAB ∈ S
(H⊗NAB ). Then
the rate of an εcoh := (εPE+ εEC+ εPA+ ε¯)-secure key is
given by
r :=
1
N
inf
ρnAB∈Γ
n
εPE
(
H ε¯min (ρ
n
XE |E)− leakEC
)
+
2
N
log2 (2εPA) .
(17)
In the following section we show that the smooth min-
entropy for permutation-invariant states can be mainly
bounded by the min-entropy for corresponding product-
states “smoothed” over a reduced ε-environment.
B. Privacy amplification
In order to get a calculable formula for the key
rate (Eq. (17)) we bound the smooth min-entropy for
permutation-invariant states by the smooth min-entropy
for tensor-product states, which then can be easily evalu-
ated by the asymptotic equipartition property (Eq. (B7))
as explained in Section III.
We now define analogously to Eq. (10) the
permutation-invariant state with n signals, which Alice
and Bob share after the parameter estimation procedure.
ρnAB := Pn
(∑
n∈Λn
µnσ
⊗n1
1 ⊗ σ⊗n22 ⊗ σ⊗n33 ⊗ σ⊗n44
)
,
(18)
where σi with i = 1, .., 4 correspond to the projec-
tors onto the 4 Bell-states in HA ⊗ HB and Λn :=
4{
n = (n1, n2, n3, n4) :
∑4
i=1 ni = n
}
(see Eq. (10)). Ad-
ditionally, we denote the single-copy state shared by Alice
and Bob in the following as
σAB[λ] :=
4∑
i=1
λiσi (19)
with λ := (λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) =
(
n1
n ,
n2
n ,
n3
n ,
n4
n
)
.
The next theorem is one of our central results.
It gives a relation between the smooth min-entropy
for permutation-invariant states and the smooth min-
entropy for tensor-product states. The proof is inspired
by [18] and uses the fact, that there exists a certain mea-
surement on σAB [λ]
⊗n, such that the resulting state is
equal to the state ρnAB for a specific realization n. Then,
the application of some fundamental properties of the
smooth min-entropy leads to the result.
Theorem 3. Let ε¯ > 0, λ =
(
n1
n ,
n2
n ,
n3
n ,
n4
n
)
and
MAB be the quantum operation which describes the lo-
cal measurements Alice and Bob perform followed by
a partial-trace operation on Bob’s part (HB). Let
ρnXE = (MAB ⊗ 11E)⊗n ρnABE be the classical quan-
tum state obtained after applying the quantum opera-
tion (MAB ⊗ 11E)⊗n on a purification ρnABE in H⊗nABE
of a permutation-invariant state ρnAB ∈ S
(H⊗nAB). Anal-
ogously let σXE [λ]
⊗n = (MAB ⊗ 11E)⊗n σABE [λ]⊗n
be the classical quantum state obtained after applying
the quantum operation (MAB ⊗ 11E)⊗n on a purifica-
tion σABE [λ]
⊗n of a tensor-product state σAB [λ]
⊗n ∈
S (H⊗nAB). Let E be a POVM on HA ⊗ HB which mea-
sures the QBER. Let Qn, Pn be an element of the fre-
quency distribution Qn, Pn of the outcomes when apply-
ing the measurement E⊗n to ρnAB and σ⊗nAB , respectively.
Then except with probability ε¯
H ε¯min (ρ
n
XE |E) ≥ H ε¯/(2n
2)
min
(
σ⊗nXE
[
λ =
n
n
]
|E
)
− 1, (20)
where
Γcoh :=
{
τAB :
1
2
||Qm − Pn||1 ≤ ξcoh (ε¯, n,m)
}
(21)
with
ξcoh (ε¯, n,m) :=
1
2
ξatt (ε¯, 2, n) + ξ
( ε¯
2
, n,m
)
(22)
where
ξatt(ε¯, 2, n) :=
√
16 ln (2) + 8 ln (1/ε¯)
n
(23)
and
ξ
( ε¯
2
, n,m
)
:=
√
(m+ n)(m+ 1) ln (2/ε¯)
8m2n
(24)
defines the set of tensor-product states τ⊗n which pass
the parameter estimation procedure.
Proof: The state to be considered is given by ρnXE and
can be expressed as a convex combination of states for
all possible realizations n with probability µn, i.e.
ρnXE =
∑
n∈Λn
µnρ
n
XE [n]. (25)
Note that this structure is provided in Eq. (18) and is
conserved due to the linearity ofMAB and a purification
of ρnAB, which is optimal for Eve.
The first part proves the theorem for the special case,
that only one µn in Eq. (25) is non-zero, i.e. we consider
a single realization n. Then, part 2 extends part 1 to the
general case.
Part 1:
Let |φi〉 be an extension to HA ⊗HB ⊗HE of σi (see
Eq. (18)) with the condition, that the remaining states
trAB
(
P|φi〉
)
are mutually orthogonal for i ∈ {1, .., 4}.
Note that this choice of orthogonal ancillas is optimal,
since it enables the eavesdropper to distinguish perfectly
the reduced states shared by Alice and Bob. Let Sn be
the set of distinguishable permutations pi on n qubits for
a fixed realization n. Then, with
|ψ〉nABE :=
1√|Sn|
∑
pi∈Sn
pi
(
4⊗
i=1
|φi〉⊗ni
)
(26)
and
|φ〉λABE :=
4∑
i=1
√
λi |φi〉 (27)
we define
ρnXE [n] := (MAB ⊗ 11E)⊗n P|ψ〉nABE (28)
σXE [λ] := (MAB ⊗ 11E)P|φ〉λABE (29)
for an arbitrary, but fixed realization n. For any i ∈
{1, .., 4} let Pi be the projector onto the support of
(M⊗ 11E)P|φi〉 which by definition are orthogonal for
distinct i. Let F be a measurement defined by
F : ρ→
1∑
z=0
FzρF
†
z ⊗ |z〉 〈z| , (30)
where
F0 :=
∑
pi∈Sn
pi
(
P⊗n11 ⊗ P⊗n22 ⊗ P⊗n33 ⊗ P⊗n44
)
(31)
and F1 := 11−F0. Then F0 picks out a specific realization
n from the tensor-product state σXE [λ]
⊗n, i.e.
ρnXE [n] =
1
PZ(Z = 0)
F0
(
σXE [λ]
⊗n
)
F †0 (32)
with PZ(Z = 0) = tr
(
F0
(
σ⊗nXE [λ]
)
F †0
)
= |Sn|
∏4
i=1 λ
ni
i
(For a detailed proof see [18], Lemma A.4).
5Now let ρ¯nXEZ [n] be the resulting state after applyingF on σ⊗nXE [λ] and let Z be the classical measurement
outcome, i.e.
ρ¯nXEZ [n] =
1∑
z=0
Fzσ
⊗n
XE [λ]F
†
z ⊗ |z〉 〈z| (33)
=:
1∑
z=0
PZ(Z = z)ρ¯
nZ=z
XE [n]⊗ |z〉 〈z| . (34)
Then it follows directly from Eq. (32) that
ρnXE [n] = ρ¯
nZ=0
XE [n] (35)
and therefore
H ε¯min (ρ
n
XE [n]|E) = H ε¯min
(
ρ¯nZ=0XE [n]|E
)
. (36)
With some fundamental properties of the smooth min-
entropy we get
H ε¯min
(
ρ¯nZ=0XE [n]|E
)
Eq. (A7)
≥ HpZ(Z=0)ε¯min (ρ¯nXEZ [n]|EZ)
Eq. (B1)
≥ HpZ(Z=0)ε¯min (ρ¯nXEZ [n]|E)− log2 (rank(ρZ)).
(37)
By definition, the orthogonality and completeness of the
set {Fz} ensures that trZ (ρ¯nXEZ [n]) = σ⊗nXE [λ], such that
we can apply Eq. (A2) in the Appendix. This leads to
H
pZ(Z=0)ε¯
min (ρ¯
n
XEZ [n]|E)− log2 (rank(ρZ))
Eq. (A2)
≥ HpZ(Z=0)ε¯min
(
σ⊗nXE [λ]|E
)− log2 (rank(ρZ))
≥ H ε¯/n2min
(
σ⊗nXE [λ]|E
)− 1, (38)
where we used in the last step that rank(ρZ) ≤ 2 and
from Lemma 7 in the Appendix that
pZ(Z = 0) = |Sn|
4∏
i=1
λnii > 1/n
2. (39)
The following part generalizes the proof to the unre-
stricted case.
Part 2:
Now let ρnABE := P|ψ〉 with
|ψ〉 :=
∑
n∈Λn
√
µn |ψ〉nABE (40)
be a purification of ρnAB. For any n ∈ Λn let HnE be
the smallest subspace of H⊗nE containing the support of
the traces ρnE [n] = trH⊗nAB
(ρnABE [n]). By the definition
of the vectors |φi〉 as in part 1, the subspaces HnE are
orthogonal for distinct n ∈ Λn. There exists a projective
measurement F ′ onto the subspaces H⊗nAB⊗HnE . Now let
the state ρ˜nXEZ′ be the resulting state from the measure-
ment F ′ of the state ρnXE and let Z ′ ∈ Λn be the classical
outcome, i.e.
ρ˜nXEZ′ =
∑
n∈Λn
F ′
n
ρnXEF
′†
n
⊗ |n〉 〈n| (41)
=:
∑
n∈Λn
µnρ
n
XE [n]⊗ |n〉 〈n| . (42)
By the definition of the state ρnXE we know that for a tol-
erated QBER Qm the parameter Qn for a virtual mea-
surement on n signals has to fulfil except with probability
ε¯
2 that
1
2
||Qm −Qn||1 ≤ ξ
( ε¯
2
, n,m
)
. (43)
Note that the choice of ε¯2 is arbitrary. In princi-
ple, the introduction of a new parameter could lead
to better results. Now, this condition implies that re-
alizations n in the permutation-invariant state ρnAB =∑
n∈Λn µnρ
n
AB[n], whose corresponding parameter Qn
does not fulfill the condition in Eq. (43), only appear
with small probability, i.e. more precisely
∑
n: 12 ||Qm−Qn||1>ξ(
ε¯
2 ,n,m)
µn ≤ ε¯
2
. (44)
This behaviour of the probabilities enables us to apply
Eq. (A6) in the Appendix for probability ε′ = ε¯2 to re-
strict the states ρnAB[n] (or equivalently their correspond-
ing realizations n) to the set
Γ˜nε¯/2 :=
{
σnAB [n] :
1
2
||Qm −Qn||1 ≤ ξ
( ε¯
2
, n,m
)}
.
(45)
Namely, we have
H ε¯min (ρ
n
XE |E)
Eq. (A4)
≥ H ε¯min (ρ˜nXEZ′ |EZ ′)
Eq. (A6)
≥ inf
ρnAB [n]∈Γ˜
n
ε¯/2
H
ε¯/2
min (ρ
n
XE [n]|E) . (46)
Then Eq. (46) becomes, together with Eq. (36), Eq. (37)
and Eq. (38),
inf
ρnAB [n]∈Γ˜
n
ε¯/2
H
ε¯/2
min (ρ
n
XE [n]|E)
≥ inf
ρnAB [n]∈Γ˜
n
ε¯/2
H
ε¯/(2n2)
min
(
σ⊗nXE [λ =
n
n
]|E
)
− 1
(47)
Since the min-entropy is now a function of a tensor-
product state, we would like to express the restricting in-
fimum in terms of the statisticsPn of this tensor-product.
By definition, we have ρ1XE [n] = σXE [λ =
n
n ], such that
we can apply Lemma 8 in the Appendix (for k = N = n),
6which states that, except with probability ε¯, the statistics
Pn of the tensor-product state σ
⊗n
XE [λ =
n
n ] is ξatt-close
to Qn, i.e.
1
2
||Qn −Pn||1 ≤ ξatt (ε¯, |E|, n) . (48)
(Here the choice of ε¯ is arbitrary. The consideration of
a new parameter could in general lead to better results.)
Now, we are able to bound the distance between Pn and
the tolerated QBER Qm measured during parameter es-
timation by using the triangular inequality.
1
2
||Qm − Pn||1 ≤
1
2
||Qm −Qn||1 +
1
2
||Qn − Pn||1
≤ ξ
( ε¯
2
, n,m
)
+
ξatt (ε¯, 2, n)
2
=: ξcoh (ε¯, n,m) , (49)
where we used that for the POVM applied for parameter
estimation (see Eq. (6) and Section IVA) the number of
POVM elements becomes 2 (see [8]) and that [8]
1
2
||Qn − Pn||1 ≤
1
2
1
2
||Qn −Pn||1 . (50)
Consequently we end up in
inf
ρnAB [n]∈Γ˜
n
ε¯/2
H
ε¯/(2n2)
min
(
σ⊗nXE [λ =
n
n
]|E
)
− 1
≥ inf
σAB∈Γξcoh
H
ε¯/(2n2)
min
(
σ⊗nXE
[
λ =
n
n
]
|E
)
− 1.
(51)
The assertion then follows by putting Eq. (51) and
Eq. (47) into Eq. (46).
Finally, we are able to formulate a calculable rate of
an εcoh-secure key for coherent attacks.
Theorem 4. Let εPE, εEC, εPA, ε¯ > 0 and let ρ
n
XE =
(NAB ⊗ 11E) ρNABE be a permutation-invariant state for
a purification ρNABE in H⊗NABE of ρNAB ∈ S
(H⊗NAB ). Then
the rate of an εcoh := (εPE + εEC + εPA + 2ε¯)-secure key
is given by
rcoh :=
n
N
[
inf
ρAB∈Γcoh
(
S(X |E)− leakEC
n
)
− 5
√
log2(4n
2/ε¯)
n
]
− 1
N
+
2
N
log2 (2εPA), (52)
where
Γcoh =
{
σAB :
1
2
||Qm − Pn||1 ≤ ξcoh (ε¯, n,m)
}
(53)
with
ξcoh (ε¯, n,m) :=
ξatt (ε¯, 2, n)
2
+ ξ
( ε¯
2
, n,m
)
(54)
for
ξ
( ε¯
2
, n,m
)
:=
√
(m+ n)(m+ 1) ln (2/ε¯)
8m2n
, (55)
ξatt(ε¯, 2, n) :=
√
16 ln (2) + 8 ln (1/ε¯)
n
(56)
and
S(X |E) = S(ρXE)− S(ρE) (57)
with S(ρ) := − tr (ρ log2 ρ).
Proof: The proof follows by inserting the result from
Eq. (20) into Eq. (17) and using Eq. (B7) to express the
smooth min-entropy of product states by the conditional
von Neumann entropy of a single-copy state.
A careful analysis of the proof of Eq. (20) enables us
to obtain the main corrections for the secret key rate
for coherent attacks (Eq. (52)) in comparison to collec-
tive attacks (Eq. (8)): First, for coherent attacks the
probability to measure a single realization n for a given
tensor-product state is rather small, which makes the ε-
environment, e.g. in Eq. (51) small. Second, the statis-
tics for the different attacks are not identical in general.
Additional fluctuations have to be taken into account
as done by considering ξatt (see Eqs. (54) and (56)).
These corrections loose their corrupting influence on the
secret key rate, when considering the asymptotic limit
(N → ∞, ε → 0). In this case ξatt becomes zero and no
additional fluctuations have to be added to the QBER,
thus the corrections vanish. This confirms the equiva-
lence of collective and coherent attacks for permutation-
invariant protocols stated in [17, 18] in the asymptotic
limit. But for a finite number of signals these corrections
have a dramatic impact on the secret key rate. And, since
these additional terms seem unavoidable, this might be a
hint, that the equivalence of collective and coherent at-
tacks might not hold for permutation-invariant states in
the regime of finite resources.
The following section shortly reviews the known post-
selection technique [21], which we then will compare to
Eq. (52).
V. POST-SELECTION - A SHORT REVIEW
In order to determine the quality of rcoh (Eq. (52))
from the previous section, we have to compare it to key
rates obtained by strategies existing in the literature. Up
to now, there exist two main techniques to quantify secret
key rates for finite resources for coherent attacks for the
whole class of permutation-invariant protocols, namely
the de Finetti approach [1, 22] and the post-selection
technique [21]. Since Sheridan et al showed in [7] that
the latter technique leads to higher secret key rates, we
only take the post-selection technique for comparison.
The post-selection technique applied to QKD estimates
the deviation of the finite key rate rpost obtained from a
7permutation-invariant protocol against coherent attacks
from the corresponding rate rcoll against collective at-
tacks. The rate of an εpost-secure key is given by [21]
rpost = rcoll − 30 log2 (N + 1)/N (58)
where rcoll is given by Eq. (8) evaluated for the security
parameter εcoll = εpost(N + 1)
−15.
VI. COMPARISON
In this section we compare our newly developed se-
cret key rate rcoh (Eq. (52)) and the known rate rpost
(Eq. (58)) for coherent attacks to the secret key rate
evaluated under the assumption of collective attacks rcoll
(Eq. (8)) for the BB84 protocol and the six-state proto-
col.
The finite-key rates are calculated for a total secu-
rity parameter of ε := εcoll = εpost = εcoh = 10
−9.
In the following let QBER := Qm denote the tolerated
QBER from the POVM used for parameter estimation
(see Eq. (6) and Section IVA).
The results are obtained from a numerical optimization
procedure, which maximizes the key rate with respect to
the parameters m, ε¯, εPE, εEC, εPA.
In FIG. 1 the secret key rates are shown as a function
of the initial number of signalsN for different QBERs for
the BB84 protocol. FIG. 2 presents an analogous calcu-
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Comparison of the secret key rates rcoll
(Eq. (8)) (black circles), rpost (Eq. (58)) (green squares) and
rcoh (Eq. (52)) (red triangles) versus the number N of initial
signals for different QBERs with security parameter ε = 10−9
for the BB84 protocol in logarithmic scale; QBER = 0.01
(straight lines), QBER = 0.1 (dotted lines).
lation for the six-state protocol. Note that, as mentioned
in Section IVB, in both cases we recover the known re-
sult that coherent attacks become collective attacks in
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Comparison of the secret key rates rcoll
(Eq. (8)) (black circles), rpost (Eq. (58)) (green squares) and
rcoh (Eq. (52)) (red triangles) versus the number N of initial
signals for different QBERs with security parameter ε = 10−9
for the six-state protocol in logarithmic scale; QBER = 0.01
(straight lines), QBER = 0.1 (dotted lines).
the limit of infinitely many signals N . For finite N the
figures show that the new rate rcoh is always significantly
higher in comparison to the rate rpost obtained from the
post-selection technique. This advantage of rcoh can be
seen for a rather small QBER = 0.01 as well as for a
high value QBER = 0.1. For example we obtain that
the increase of rcoh in comparison to rpost is around 43%
for a QBER of 0.01 (N = 106) and 33% for a QBER
of 0.1 (N = 1010) for the BB84 protocol. In case of the
six-state protocol rcoh exceeds rpost by around 51% for a
QBER of 0.01 (N = 106) and 45% for a QBER of 0.1
(N = 108).
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented a new method to quantify
the rate of a secret key for general permutation-invariant
protocols for coherent attacks. We show a technique to
trace the calculation of secret key rates for coherent at-
tacks back to the analysis of collective attacks. The high
quality of this method manifests itself by a comparison
to the up to now best-known strategy, the post-selection
technique. For the treatment of collective attacks we ap-
plied the von Neumann entropy bound. We showed that
for a finite number of initial signals the secret key rates
for the BB84 and the six-state protocol obtained by our
method exceed the rates coming from the post-selection
technique significantly. In case of the BB84 protocol,
higher secret key rates have been obtained in [10] and
[11] by a specialized method, which can, however, not be
applied to the six-state protocol. Our method, in con-
trast, can be applied to all permutation-invariant quan-
8tum key distribution protocols for which an analysis of
collective attacks is available. Since our results strongly
depend on the underlying analysis of collective attacks, a
prospective progress in the analysis of collective attacks
will automatically cause a progress in our strategy with
respect to secret key rates.
Additionally the results of our derivation confirm the
known result that, in the limit of infinitely many initial
signals, coherent attacks are as powerful as collective at-
tacks. Furthermore, we point out the main impact on
the corrections for the key rate against coherent attacks
in comparison to collective attacks. Since this extensive
impact seems unavoidable, this might give some evidence
for the inequivalence of the two types of attacks for finite
resources.
Since the assumption of permutation-invariance is
fairly weak (most protocols used in the literature are
permutation-invariant or can be made to), the results
of this paper can be widely applied.
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Appendix A
1. Properties of the (smooth) min-entropy
Lemma 1. Let ρABZ :=
∑
z∈Z PZ(z)ρ
z
AB ⊗ |z〉 〈z| ∈S (HA ⊗HB ⊗HZ) be a classical-quantum state with
ρAB = trZ (ρABZ) and σB ∈ S (HB), then
Hεmin (ρABZ |B) ≥ Hεmin (ρAB|B) . (A1)
Proof: For any ν > 0 there exists ρ¯AB ∈ B ε2 (ρAB)
such that for any σB
Hmin (ρ¯AB|σB) ≥ Hεmin (ρAB|σB)− ν.
Then it follows with Eq. (B4) that
Hmin (ρ¯ABZ |σB) ≥ Hmin (ρ¯AB|σB) .
To conclude the proof it suffices to verify that ρ¯ABZ ∈
B ε2 (ρABZ).
1
2
||ρ¯ABZ − ρABZ ||1 ≤
1
2
||ρ¯AB − ρAB||1 ≤
ε
2
,
where we used the fact that the trace-distance cannot
increase when applying a quantum operation (see [1],
Lemma A.2.1). The assertion then follows by choosing
σB such that
Hεmin (ρAB|σB) = Hεmin (ρAB|B)
and the fact that
Hmin (ρ¯ABZ |B) ≥ Hmin (ρ¯ABZ |σB) .
Lemma 2. Let ρAB ∈ S (HA ⊗HB), {|z〉}z a family of
orthogonal vectors in HZ and ε > 0. Then for a state
ρ¯ABZ :=
∑
z∈Z FzρABF
†
z ⊗ |z〉 〈z| with
∑
z∈Z F
†
zFz = 11
and trZ (ρ¯ABZ) = ρAB
Hεmin (ρAB|B) ≤ Hεmin (ρ¯ABZ |B) . (A2)
Proof: From the definition of ρ¯ABZ it follows immedi-
ately that
Hεmin (trZ (ρ¯ABZ) |B) = Hεmin (ρAB|B) .
Then the assertion follows with Lemma 1
Hεmin (trZ (ρ¯ABZ) |B) ≤ Hεmin (ρ¯ABZ |B) . (A3)
Lemma 3. Let ρAB ∈ S (HA ⊗HB), {|z〉}z a family
of orthogonal vectors in HZ and ε > 0. Then for a
state ρ¯ABZ :=
∑
z∈Z PZ(Z = z)F
′
zρABF
′†
z ⊗ |z〉 〈z| with∑
z∈Z F
′†
z F
′
z = 11 and trZ (ρ¯ABZ) = ρAB
Hεmin (ρAB|B) ≥ Hεmin (ρ¯ABZ |BZ) . (A4)
Proof: From the definition of ρ¯ABZ it follows immedi-
ately that
Hεmin (trZ (ρ¯ABZ) |B) = Hεmin (ρAB|B) .
Then the assertion follows from the strong subadditivity
of the smooth min-entropy (see Eq. (B3)), i.e.
Hεmin (trZ (ρ¯ABZ) |B) ≥ Hεmin (ρ¯ABZ |BZ) . (A5)
Lemma 4. Let ρABZ =
∑
z∈Z PZ(z)ρ
z
AB ⊗ |z〉〈z| be a
classical quantum state and ε, ε′ > 0, then for any subset
Z ′ ⊆ Z such that Prob[z ∈ Z ′] > 1− ε′,
H
ε+ε′
min (ρABZ |BZ) ≥ inf
z∈Z′
Hεmin (ρ
z
AB|B) . (A6)
Proof: For any ν > 0 and z ∈ Z ′ there exists ρ¯zAB ∈
B ε2 (ρzAB) such that for any σzB
Hmin (ρ¯
z
AB|σzB) ≥ Hεmin (ρzAB|σzB)− ν.
Let
ρ¯ABZ :=
∑
z∈Z′
PZ′(z)ρ¯
z
AB ⊗ |z〉〈z|.
Then it follows with Eq. (B2) that
Hmin (ρ¯ABZ |σBZ) = inf
z∈Z′
Hmin (ρ¯
z
AB|σzB)
≥ inf
z∈Z′
Hεmin (ρ
z
AB|σzB)− ν.
9To conclude the proof it suffices to verify that ρ¯ABZ ∈
B ε+ε
′
2 (ρABZ).
1
2
||ρ¯ABZ − ρABZ ||1
Eq. (B6)
=
∑
z∈Z′
PZ′(z)
1
2
||ρ¯zAB − ρzAB||1
+
∑
z∈Z\Z′
PZ\Z′(z)
1
2
||ρzAB||1
≤ ε
2
∑
z∈Z′
PZ′(z) +
1
2
∑
z∈Z\Z′
PZ\Z′(z)
≤ ε + ε
′
2
.
The assertion then follows by choosing σzB such that
Hεmin (ρ
z
AB|σzB) = Hεmin (ρzAB|B)
and the fact that
Hmin (ρ¯ABZ |BZ) ≥ Hmin (ρ¯ABZ |σBZ) .
Lemma 5. Let ρABZ =
∑
z∈Z PZ(z)ρ
z
AB ⊗ |z〉〈z| be a
classical quantum state and εz := PZ(z)ε, then
Hεzmin (ρABZ |BZ) ≤ Hεmin (ρzAB|B) . (A7)
Proof: For any ν > 0 and z ∈ Z there exists ρ′ABZ ∈
B εz2 (ρABZ) such that for any σBZ
Hmin (ρ
′
ABZ |σBZ) ≥ Hεzmin (ρABZ |σBZ)− ν.
Then it follows with Eq. (B5) that
Hmin (ρ
′z
AB|σzB) ≥ Hεzmin (ρABZ |σBZ)− ν.
To conclude the proof it suffices to verify that ρ′zAB ∈
B ε2 (ρzAB).
εz
2
≥ 1
2
||ρ′ABZ − ρABZ ||1
Eq. (B6)
=
∑
z∈Z
PZ(z)
1
2
||ρ′zAB − ρzAB||1
≥ PZ(z)1
2
||ρ′zAB − ρzAB||1 .
The assertion then follows by choosing σBZ such that
Hεzmin (ρABZ |σBZ) = Hεzmin (ρABZ |BZ)
and the fact that
Hmin (ρ
′z
AB|B) ≥ Hmin (ρ′zAB|σzB) .
2. Estimation of frequency distributions
Lemma 6. Let εPE > 0 and 0 ≤ k ≤ N . Let ρN ∈
S (H⊗N) be a permutation-invariant quantum state, and
let E be a POVM on H which measures the quantum bit
error rate (QBER). Let Qk and QN−k be the QBERs
when applying the measurement E⊗k and E⊗N−k, respec-
tively, to different subsystems of ρN . Then except with
probability εPE it holds that
1
2
||QN−k −Qk||1 ≤ ξ(εPE, N − k, k) (A8)
with ξ(εPE, N − k, k) :=
√
N(k+1) ln (1/εPE)
8k2(N−k) .
Proof: It follows from the supplementary in-
formation (Note 2) of [10] that with εPE :=
e−
2k(N−k)
N
k
k+1 (2ξ(εPE,N−k,k))
2
Prob[Qn ≥ Qk + 2ξ(εPE, N − k, k)] ≤ εPE. (A9)
The assertion then follows by negation of the statement.
3. Multinomial distribution
Lemma 7. Let n ∈ N and λi = nin for i = 1, .., 4 with∑4
i=1 ni = n. Then
n!
n1!n2!n3!n4!
4∏
i=1
λnii >
1
n2
(A10)
for n > 500.
Proof: After applying the logarithm we get
ln
(
n!
n1!n2!n3!n4!
4∏
i=1
λnii
)
= ln (n!)−
4∑
i=1
ln (ni!)+ni ln
(ni
n
)
.
(A11)
By using the Stirling-formula
√
2pin
(n
e
)n
< n! <
(
1 +
1
11n
)√
2pin
(n
e
)n
(A12)
we get for n > 0
ln (n!)−
4∑
i=1
ln (ni!) + ni ln
(ni
n
)
>
1
2
ln (2pin)−
(
4∑
i=1
1
2
ln (2pini) + ln
(
1 +
1
11ni
))
= −3
2
ln (2pin)−
(
4∑
i=1
1
2
ln
(ni
n
)
+ ln
(
1 +
1
11ni
))
> −3
2
ln (2pin)− 4 ln
(
12
11
)
, (A13)
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where we used in the last line that 12 ln
(
ni
n
)
< 0 and
ln
(
1 + 111ni
)
< ln
(
1 + 111
)
for ni > 0 ∀i = 1, .., 4. After
exponentiation we end up in
n!
n1!n2!n3!n4!
4∏
i=1
λnii >
1
(2pin)3/2
(
11
12
)4
>
1
n2
, (A14)
which holds for n > 500.
Appendix B: Known results
Here, we review known results, which are crucial for
derivations in the paper.
1. Properties of the (smooth) min-entropy
• Chain rule (see [1], Theorem 3.2.12): Let ρABC ∈
S (HA ⊗HB ⊗HC) and ε ≥ 0. Then for ρC =
trAB (ρABC)
Hεmin (ρABC |B) ≤ Hεmin (ρABC |BC) + log2 (rank (ρC)).
(B1)
• Conditioning on classical information (see [1], The-
orem 3.2.12): Let ρABZ :=
∑
z∈Z PZ(z)ρ
z
AB ⊗
|z〉 〈z| ∈ S (HA ⊗HB ⊗HZ) a classical-quantum
state, then
Hmin (ρABZ |BZ) = inf
z∈Z
Hmin (ρ
z
AB|B) . (B2)
• Strong subadditivity (see [1]. Theorem 3.2.12): Let
ρABC ∈ S (HA ⊗HB ⊗HC) and ε ≥ 0, then
Hεmin (ρABC |BC) ≤ Hεmin (ρAB|B) . (B3)
• Partial-trace operation on classical subsystem can
only decrease min-entropy (see [1], Lemma 3.1.9):
Let ρABZ :=
∑
z∈Z PZ(z)ρ
z
AB ⊗ |z〉 〈z| ∈
S (HA ⊗HB ⊗HZ) be a classical-quantum state
with ρAB = trZ (ρABZ) and σB ∈ S (HB), then
Hmin (ρABZ |σB) ≥ Hmin (ρAB|σB) . (B4)
• Quantum operations can only increase min-entropy
(see [25], Theorem 18): Let ρAB ∈ S (HA ⊗HB)
and let E be a quantum operation such that ρ¯AC =
(11A ⊗ E) ρAB, then
Hεmin (ρ¯AC |C) ≥ Hεmin (ρAB|B) . (B5)
• Trace-distance of mixtures (see [1], Lemma A.2.2):
Let ρAZ :=
∑
z∈Z PZ(z)ρ
z
A⊗|z〉 〈z| ∈ S (HA ⊗HZ)
be a classical-quantum state and an analogous def-
inition for ρ′AZ , then
1
2
||ρAZ − ρ′AZ ||1 =
∑
z∈Z
PZ(z)
1
2
||ρzA − ρ′zA ||1 . (B6)
• Smooth min-entropy of quantum tensor-product
states (see [1], Corollary 3.3.7): Let ρ⊗nXE ∈
S
(
(HX ⊗HE)⊗n
)
a classical-quantum tensor-
product state and ε ≥ 0, then
Hεmin
(
ρ⊗nXE |E
) ≥ n
(
S(X |E)− 5
√
log2 (2/ε)
n
)
, (B7)
where S(X |E) = S(ρXE) − S(ρE) with S(ρ) :=
− tr (ρ log2 ρ).
2. Estimation of frequency distributions
Lemma 8. [18, 26] Let εatt > 0 and 0 ≤ k ≤ N .
Let ρN ∈ S (H⊗N) be a permutation-invariant quantum
state, and let E and F be POVMs on H with |E| and
|F| outcomes, respectively. Let QEk and QFN−k be the fre-
quency distribution of the outcomes when applying the
measurement E⊗k and F⊗N−k, respectively, to different
subsystems of ρN . Finally, let Ω be any convex set of
density operators such that, for any operator A on n− 1
subsystems, the normalization of trn−1
(
11⊗Aρn11⊗A†)
is contained in Ω. Then except with probability εatt, there
exists a state σ ∈ Ω such that
k
N
1
2
∣∣∣∣QEk −PEk ∣∣∣∣1 + N − kN 12
∣∣∣∣QFN−k −PFN−k∣∣∣∣1
≤ ξatt(εatt, |E|+ |F|, N) (B8)
where PEk , P
F
N−k denote the probability distributions
of the outcomes when measuring σ with respect to
E and F , respectively and ξatt(εatt, |E| + |F|, N) :=√
8 ln (2)(|E|+|F|)+8 ln (1/εatt)
N .
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